

# The President's Daily Brief

*November 17, 1976*

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~~Top Secret~~<sup>25X1</sup>

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SOUTH AFRICA - RHODESIA:

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
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
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*Status of Soviet ICBM Dismantling*

Obligations	March 1	June	July	August	September	October
Required number of launchers with:						
Dismantling Complete	51	51	51	51	51	67
Dismantling Initiated	0	16	28	28	44	56
	51	67	79	79	95	123
Observed Performance	(Dec 4- Mar 29)	(Mar 22- May 17)	(Jul 9- Aug 3)	(Aug 4- Sep 6)	(Sep 7- Oct 19)	(Oct 12- Nov 5)
Dismantling Complete	8	13-16	33	33	39	51
Dismantling in Progress	43	38-35	20	46	69	70
	51	51	53	79	108	121


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USSR: [redacted]

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[redacted] since mid-October the Soviets have completed the dismantling of 12 more older ICBM launchers and have begun dismantling 13 others. Additional dismantling activity could have occurred, however; of the 209 original SS-7 and SS-8 launchers, [redacted]

As of November 5 the Soviets had at least 121 launchers in varying stages of dismantlement, of which 51 can be considered fully dismantled according to the procedures established by the Protocol to the Standing Consultative Commission. An additional 20 launchers have been rendered unusable and could not be returned to operational status in substantially less time than would be required for new construction.

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The Soviets were obligated to have 67 launchers fully dismantled or destroyed by early October and to have work underway on 56 others by late October. The Soviets will soon incur additional dismantling obligations. A Delta-class submarine with 16 missile launchers

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probably will begin sea trials later this month or early in December. This will require the USSR to begin dismantling 16 more of its older launchers.



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CHILE: *The government's announcement of its decision to release 323 persons imprisoned under the state of siege is a concession to international criticism.*

A spokesman of the Pinochet government said 18 other prisoners "too dangerous to be freed in Chile" would be expelled if some country would accept them. The spokesman said two of them--Communist Party chief Luis Corvalan and a former senator of the Allende coalition--would be released only if the USSR and Cuba would reciprocate by freeing two prominent prisoners.

By releasing its prisoners, the Pinochet government probably hopes to lessen the impact of a critical report recently circulated by the UN human rights investigating group and improve its image with the next US administration. The government's action is also a tacit admission that internal security is no longer a problem since any new roundup of "subversives" would provoke even more intense criticism abroad.

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NOTE


*Leftist students in Greece seem bent on marching on the US embassy in Athens today despite government efforts to dissuade them.*

If both students and government remain adamant, some violence is likely. Greek security forces should be able to protect both the embassy and the consulate general in Salonica, where a similar march is scheduled to take place.

The activity is in commemoration of a student uprising in 1973 that brought down one junta only to have it replaced by another. The marches reflect the standard leftist charge, which many Greeks believe, that the US installed and supported the juntas and was responsible for their policy toward Cyprus.

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## ISRAEL-LEBANON

*Most Israeli leaders believe that the collapse of Lebanon's political system and the rise in Syrian influence there will inevitably lead to a weakening of Israel's strategic position--if not now, then certainly in the long run. Prime Minister Rabin's government has felt powerless to prevent these developments and would even concede that Lebanon could have rapidly undergone what for Israel would have been a much more potentially dangerous transformation had Syria not intervened in the way it did.*

Although the Israelis remain wary of Syrian intentions, they have not been displeased by the unusual and unexpected turn of events in recent months in Lebanon. The Syrians' split with the Palestinian guerrillas and tactical alliance with the Lebanese Christians last spring came not only as a pleasant surprise to Israeli leaders but also did much to reduce domestic pressures on them to become more directly involved in the crisis.

The Pluses...

Israel has reaped a number of benefits as a by-product of the Lebanese conflict. The preoccupation of the Palestinians, Syria, and nearly every other principal Arab state with Lebanon has resulted in:

- A virtual suspension of fedayeen terrorist raids on northern Israel.
- A relaxation of military tensions on the Golan Heights.
- A welcome breather from Arab pressures to resume negotiations for further tactical withdrawals.
- Until recently, a deepening of the split between Israel's two main adversaries, Egypt and Syria.

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The Israelis believe their policy of "calculated restraint" toward Syrian intervention and their covert aid to the Lebanese Christians have also succeeded in keeping the growth of Syrian influence in Lebanon within acceptable limits and in helping to weaken the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Israeli support has also helped the Christians to preserve some measure of independence and, of more immediate importance to Tel Aviv, to gain control over areas in southern Lebanon once used by the fedayeen to stage terrorist attacks on Israeli settlements.

...And Possible Minuses

Despite these pluses, the long term consequences of what has happened in Lebanon are far less clear and worry Israel.

With characteristic pessimism, many of Israel's leading press commentators see Lebanon inevitably slipping from its relative neutral status into the ranks of the Arab confrontation states under the influence of a stronger, more aggressive Syria, and the closing of Arab ranks once more against Israel. Some have already expressed alarm over the reconciliation between Egypt and Syria, expecting the Arabs, at a minimum, to shift their anti-Israeli propaganda campaign back into high gear.

Foreign Minister Allon and Minister of Defense Peres as well as other Israeli officials have expressed similar concerns about the future. Israeli Chief of Staff Gur recently discounted any immediate military threat from Syrian troops in Lebanon, noting that the current division of Syrian forces between Lebanon and the Golan Heights puts Syria at a greater military disadvantage than Israel.

South Lebanon

The Israelis will keep a close watch especially on southern Lebanon for any indication of a change in Syrian intentions. The Rabin government has already warned Damascus publicly, and apparently through diplomatic channels, that it will not tolerate a resumption of fedayeen cross-border operations from territory under Syrian control.

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Israel will continue its arms aid to Christian forces operating in the south in order to:

--Help them to consolidate their hold over areas along the Lebanese-Israeli border.

--Strengthen their overall bargaining position in the negotiations yet to come over Lebanon's future.

--Encourage them to continue to look to Israel for support.

*As for the Palestinians, they appear too weak and preoccupied with merely surviving at present to challenge the Christians' hold in the south. It is highly likely that Israeli pressure combined with Syria's attempts to exert greater control over the PLO will sharply curtail, if not eliminate, the fedayeen capacity for staging cross-border operations from Lebanon.*

Beyond Lebanon

Despite its transient importance, neither the Israelis nor the Arabs have ever regarded the Lebanese crisis as anything more than a sideshow to the main Arab-Israeli dispute. The Israelis have already begun to focus on what the Arabs are likely to do now that the war is almost behind them and especially on the implications for Israel of the Syrian-Egyptian rapprochement.

In general, the Lebanese civil war does not appear to have changed the Israelis' thinking about Syria or the other Arabs in any basic way. The Syrian-PLO split has at most encouraged the Rabin government to believe that it may be possible eventually to reach a better accommodation with Damascus. But Prime Minister Rabin still believes that the Arab states are not yet ready to make peace with Israel and that more interim agreements are the best that can be achieved for now.

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*The Israelis expect at a minimum that the Arabs will push for a resumption of the Geneva peace talks next year and increase their pressure on the US to extract concessions from Israel. Beyond that, the Israelis are unsure whether the reconciliation between Cairo and Damascus will result in a softening of Syria's position or a hardening of Egypt's.*

Rabin recently has expressed the concern that Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia might put pressure on the Palestinians to abandon terrorism and moderate their political position in order to make it difficult for the US, and in turn, Israel to continue to deny the PLO a role in the peace talks. Israeli leaders especially fear that the US might go along with such a move.

Whatever tactics the Arabs adopt, however, the Israelis are unlikely to change their basic negotiating strategy. Rabin is no more anxious now than he ever was to move ahead rapidly toward additional agreements.

Time remains a valuable commodity to the Israelis in any future agreements, almost as valuable as territory itself. Rabin wants time for Israel to strengthen its military defenses, to see whether the Arabs will live up to their past agreements, to test the sincerity of those Arab leaders who profess to be willing to live in peace with Israel and to accept its permanency, and to adjust psychologically and politically to shrinking security borders, if it comes to that.

*Top Secret*